The integrity of the safety case depends primarily on the quality of the reasoning embodied in the safety argument and the trustworthiness of the associated items of evidence. Safety case arguments, often depicted using graphical notations such as GSN and CAE, are typically embedded and presented in one or more documents. One of these documents is the Safety Case Report. The periodic submission of a Safety Case Report is good practice and mandated in safety standards such as UK Defence Standard 00-56. The relationship between the safety argument structure and the embedding report can take different forms. The safety case argument may provide an executive summary at the beginning of the report, drive the flow of the report or be attached as an appendix to the report. In this paper, we address the relationship that exists between the safety case, safety argument depictions and the safety case report. We highlight the potential dangers of mismatch between these three entities, including the potential illusion of strong case created through the use of a structured graphical argumentation notation. We conclude that the safety case is the reasoning as to how the system is acceptably safe. The depicted safety case is a representation of the argument that is hoped to mirror the actual safety case. Finally, the safety case report can usefully provide an elaboration of the concepts referenced within the safety argument.
Introduction
Every non-trivial safety-critical system has a safety case, regardless of whether such a safety case is documented or explained. Principally, the strength or weakness of the safety case depends first and foremost on the quality of the reasoning embodied in the safety argument and the trustworthiness of the associated items of evidence. With the recent shift in safety certification standards towards evidencebased approaches, there have been more requirements for, and reliance on, the submission of a formal safety case and a safety case report. There are different means of representing a safety case, e.g. textual, graphical, and tabular approaches.
Increasingly prominent amongst these is the use of graphical notations -such as Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) [2] and the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [4] -to depict the structure of the safety argument. Despite the increase in popularity of such notations, it is still the 'norm' for Safety Case Reports to be required to be submitted as part of the certification process. This poses the question as to the relationship between graphical depictions of the safety arguments and the content of the finally presented safety case report. Graphical depictions of the safety argument can be, and have been, used in a number of ways within safety case reports:
• In full as an Appendix / Annex to the safety case report • Integrated within the body of the safety case report (e.g. fragments of the graphical argument presented within report sections and supported by 'explanatory' text) • As an "Executive Summary" at beginning of the safety case report • As separate, stand-alone, index document to existing safety case reports However, the safety case, the depicted safety case and the safety case report represent three different concepts ( Figure  1 ). The 'real' safety case is the true reasoning as to why the system is acceptably safe. The depicted safety case is a representation of the argument that is hoped to mirror the actual safety case. Finally, the safety case report provides an elaboration of concepts referenced within the safety argument. This elaboration should not interfere with, or contradict, the flow of reasoning within the depicted safety argument. In short, understanding the difference between the safety case, the depicted safety case and the safety case report lies in comprehending the difference between the actual, assumed and explained safety case. It is easy to confuse these three entities. A good GSN safety argument may conform to all syntactic and semantic rules of GSN, yet fail to communicate a faithful representation of the actual safety argument. The representation of the argument may be outstanding, yet the argument itself may be weak. This can be misleading to safety engineers, customers and certification authorities. It is of key importance to differentiate between the quality of the reasoning, the quality of the representation, and the quality of the explanation. In the subsequent sections, we compare and contrast the concepts underlying the safety case, the safety case depiction and the safety case report, highlighting the danger of illusory overlaps.
Safety Cases
A safety case is defined in the UK Defence Standard 00-56 (Issue 4) as [6] : This definition makes no reference whatsoever to the manner in which the safety case is represented. It focuses instead on the qualities that the argument should exhibit, namely that it should be compelling, comprehensible and valid. An argument is said to be strong, weak or flawed only by reference to reasoning principles such as relevance, sufficiency and falsifiability. A good case for a safety-critical system may be based on claims that all identified safety requirements are valid and are satisfied and that the underlying lifecycle process is trustworthy. These claims are then substantiated by direct items of evidence encompassing analysis, testing, simulation and in-service history. This safety case pattern is generally considered strong as it is productbased, with supporting or backing evidence from the underlying process [3] .
The safety case is, in essence, a conceptual entity that is initially conceived in the minds of the safety engineers and managers. In other words, the safety engineers and managers have reasons to believe that the system under consideration will be acceptably safe within a given context. However, these reasons are intangible until they are represented in a comprehensible and structured way. Therefore, the key concern is to represent the safety case in a form that reasonably mirrors the actual safety case and does not distort the integrity of the argumentation.
Depicting the Safety Case
A safety case depiction must provide a satisfactory reflection of the actual safety case. The actual safety case encompasses a large number of concepts, assumptions and relationships. These elements can be distilled into a small number of elements capable of capturing and depicting the principal structures of the actual argument (e.g. key claims, assumptions, context and evidence). When building a safety case representation the first objective should be to capture these essential elements in order to reduce the gap between the assumed and the actual safety case (Figure 2 ).
Having identified the essential elements of the safety case, it is then necessary to identify the 'links' of the safety case argument [5] . For example, this activity involves determining the argument approaches (strategies) that are being used to support the claims identified, and the evidence items being used to support the arguments. At this point, if the safety case argument is not already captured in a structured form (such as GSN or CAE) it can be useful to attempt to re-represent the argument using one of these notations. Often, constructing such a visual representation of the argument structure can be the 'acid test' of whether the reader truly understands the nature of the argument being presented.
The richness of the notation in which a safety case is represented plays a key role in bridging the gap between the actual safety case and the depicted safety case. For example, a difference between CAE and GSN is that in CAE the argument node type is a representation that there exists an argument that connects a claim to evidence, and a description, of the nature of this argument. In this sense, it is an abstraction. The 'real' argument must still be presented elsewhere -e.g. in the text used to accompany this node when presented within a Safety Case Report. GSN, however, is more literal. 'Arguments' are not "first class entities" in GSN.
Arguments are presented in GSN through the structuring of claims (goals). At its heart, an argument is a series of propositions put forward in an attempt to establish a conclusion. In GSN terms, this can be interpreted as a series of child goals put forward to compel the reader to believe a parent goal.
There is an obligation in GSN that goals should be presented as prepositional (true / false) statements, and that these statements -as far as reasonably possible -represent the 'real' claims that exist within the 'real' safety case. One of the reasons for this requirement is that when authors stray from presenting a true / false claim -such as "The mechanical interlocks will mitigate failure X" -they invariably end up presenting an abstraction of a claim -such as "Interlocks claim" -meaning that the 'actual' claim is no longer depicted in the goal structure and must be presented elsewhere. Such situations mean that the safety case argument depiction becomes increasingly removed from the case that it is attempting to represent.
A burden exists on the developer of a goal structure using GSN to present a structured organisation of claims that, together, presents a compelling argument -i.e. the argument doesn't remain to be presented elsewhere. GSN authors are encouraged to present the argument, rather than an abstraction of the argument. For example, Figure 3 shows the top-level claims of a safety case argument represented in GSN. These claims, along with the argument's strategy and context elements, are not meant to be an abstraction of the top-level claims of the 'actual' argument. They instead represent the safety case developer's belief of the real / 'actual' claims of the safety case argument.
Nonetheless, it is extremely important to note that a notation is only a tool for depicting safety arguments. Such a tool may be misused. For any argument, it is important to persuade rather than state. Persuasion is primarily a logical, and not a syntactic and semantic, exercise. There can be sometimes be an illusion of truth with GSN (and other graphical) depictions of an argument -i.e. the goal structure depicts child goals G2, G3 and G4 adequately supporting parent goal G1 therefore this is assumed by the reader to be true. Any presentation of a safety case argument (whether graphically or through the text of a safety case report) should be carefully considered against actuality. Having a compelling safety case depiction does not mean that the actual safety case is compelling if the two are mismatched. Equally, it should be recognised that the absence or paucity of a safety case depiction (e.g. no formal safety case report exists) does not automatically imply that the 'actual' safety case (i.e. the 'real' reasons as to why the system is acceptably safe) is weak or absent.
Safety Case Reports
If the reasoning behind a safety case is represented in the depicted safety case, then what is the role of the safety case report? Although the graphically depicted safety argument is often included as part of the safety case report, the safety case report should not add any argumentation or items of evidence to the core of the safety case. Otherwise, the reasons as to why the system is acceptably safe become distributed and scattered across both the graphical depiction and the safety case report narrative and therefore can become difficult to locate, collate and communicate. For example, it is highly undesirable to reference some items of evidence in the depicted safety argument and others in the narrative of the safety case report. This undermines the credibility, and complicates the management, of the overall recorded safety case. Rather, the safety case report should be used to elaborate concepts referenced (often for the sake of brevity) by the safety argument depiction. For example, in Figure 3 when goal G1 talks of 'environment Y', and references this concept using context C2, a fuller description of this environment could be presented within the Safety Case Report. Here, it is important to differentiate between elaboration and argumentation [1] . In an argument, items of evidence are provided in support of the truth of a proposition. On the other hand, if a proposition is known or assumed to be true, there is no need to provide evidence in support of the proposition. Rather, it may be needed instead to explain the proposition, e.g. by providing more domain or technical details. The Safety Case Report contents additional to the graphical depiction of the safety case should not have to "carry the burden" of presenting the core inferences and argumentation of the safety case argument. (Graphical notations such as GSN were historically developed because of the problems found when attempting to communicate argument structures using narrative text.)
Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have discussed the issue of discrepancies between the safety case, safety case depictions, and the safety case report. We have highlighted the potentially dangerous illusion of being swayed too heavily in our belief of the case through the use of compelling (but potentially inaccurate) depictions of the case. The problem of correspondence between the actual and the depicted world is a universal dilemma, best exemplified in René Magritte's famous painting "The Treachery of Images" (Figure 4) -this is not a pipe, but a picture of a pipe. In the safety case domain, it is essential to comprehend and manage the differences that exist between the actual, depicted and reported safety cases. [7] 
